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The Democrats Abdicate on the Issue of War or Peace

"Never," says the policy statement newly issued by the Democratic Advisory Council, "have crises broken around us so fast and so violently and caught our government so unprepared as in the Middle East during July, in Quemoy during September, over Berlin in November."

But in none of these areas does the Council offer alternative policies; a close reading of the statement reveals that the Democrats are fully as unprepared. The panacea of the opposition turns out to be the practice of the Administration --a heavily armed rigidity. The Democratic policy statement proposes, as if it were a brand new idea, "a level of deterrent military power, now and in the future, such as to leave no doubts in the minds of the Russians and the Communist Chinese that they must not start a war or allow one to start." Or, as Mr. Truman put it less elegantly next day in a speech to the National Press Club, "There is only one way to deal with those fellows—have more guns than they do and be ready to shoot them if they start a war." This is to abandon diplomacy for arms race, negotiations for threat, flexibility for frozen, sitting-duck, postures.

Just Like Wm. S. (Two-Gun Bill) Hart

Mr. Truman grows more intrepid with the years. He plunges into the complexities of foreign policy with the audacity of a Wild West movie hero. Our most striking cultural lag seems to be at the very top of our society. In the atomic age, the United States has a President who dotes on Western stories and an ex-President, leading the opposition, who draws his inspiration from the same classics. *Y'gotta be quick on the draw and shoot from the hip; the other fellow is a plain low down ornery cuss better dead anyhow.* This is the spirit in which William S. Hart—Two Gun Bill --ruled the badlands in the old silent film days and this is the spirit in which Mr. Truman seems to dominate the Advisory Council, apparently to the frustration of its more thoughtful members, as may be seen from the Finletter speech quoted in the box on this page.

How do the Democrats feel about nuclear testing? What do they think about recognition of China? Do they see any need for a new approach to German reunification? Are they for the nuclear training of the new West German army? Their policy statement makes no reference to any of these problems. It straddles the armament issue, at one point calling for new mobile divisions (as advocated by those who believe in limited nuclear war), declaring that defense needs must not be subordinated to budgetary considerations. At another point it calls for "total disarmament down to the levels needed for local policing" but only as the end of a "reliable stage by stage plan." This resembles the cumbersome package proposal to which the Administration clings.

A Protest From the Inside

"There has been a curious debate from time to time by the politicians, which is—is this question of foreign policy an issue in which the people are interested? Shouldn't we stick to the bread and butter issues that are going to win votes? Aren't the people really basically disinterested in all these complex questions of defense, the ICBM, the Far East, Southeast Asia, Berlin and all the rest? Some little fringe, the politicians tell us, some few of the intellectuals may be interested in these things, but not the great mass of voters . . . I think it is about time . . . that we stop this nonsense.

"In the first place, it is immoral. How a party can seriously fail to put the question of war and peace at the very top of the matters in which it is interested, I cannot understand. If there were not a single vote in it, it would be shocking. . . . This idea that people are not interested in it [foreign policy] is complete nonsense . . . an intolerably condescending attitude. Precisely why is it that these wise politicians are so convinced that the American people haven't brains enough or heart enough to be interested . . . ?

"We are carrying on our foreign policy . . . pretty much the same way we would have done before the days of the atom bomb—with an attitude: sure, we are going to do our best to protect our interests without a war, but basically we do not believe there is much chance of that . . . in the meantime . . . play a game of chess with the other fellow, sort of blocking him hither and yon . . . and generally hope for the best. . . .

"I don't see any real deep concern in the Republican Administration with the menace of war, and as a result mighty little effort to do anything about it. But I must say that I don't see anything very much better on the Democratic side."

—Thomas K. Finletter, former Air Force Secretary, member Administrative Committee, Democratic Advisory Council, addressing the Women's Suburban Democratic Club in Washington, Dec. 8, the day after the Council issued its policy statement.

The silence on nuclear testing is striking, when one recalls Adlai Stevenson's initiative in the 1956 campaign. One expected the Democrats to boast that Mr. Eisenhower was only doing at Geneva what they long ago advocated. Does the silence reflect Mr. Truman's opposition? Mr. Truman in his press club speech again criticized Mr. Eisenhower for "surrendering" in Korea. Does he in the same spirit oppose the Geneva talks? Or is the silence the familiar State Department attitude, common to both the Dulles and Acheson regimes, that considers foreign policy an esoteric matter too complex for the common man's understanding, too sacred to be profaned by debate in public? Is Mr. Truman's inane give-em-hell demagogy about the G. O. P. being the "bloated-

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Three D's for Germany and Central Europe: Disengagement, Denuclearization, Demilitarization

Bevan Backs Rapacki Plan in the Commons Debate on Berlin

The Berlin crisis was the focus of the foreign policy debate by the British House of Commons Dec. 4. We reprint here the speech of Aneurin Bevan for the Labor Party, as reported in the next morning's Times of London. We believe it deserves close study by those who would like to see the Democratic party in this country develop a coherent and peaceful opposition view in foreign policy.—IFS.

'The Russian proposal to turn Berlin into a free city was impracticable, and also unacceptable. The Opposition did not believe that it was a serious proposal, but they did not believe that the present situation was acceptable either, because it was always going to be a source of trouble in Europe. . . .

"The Opposition said that a solution must be found for the Berlin problem, but a solution for the Berlin problem was a solution for the German problem, and a solution for the German problem was a solution for the European problem.

"Mr. Krushchev was quite right in his Note when he said that the increasing rearming of west Germany was a source of alarm to Poland and Russia. It alarmed him, too. Dr. Adenauer said to his own party on Tuesday that he was not ready for a peace treaty, and not ready to discuss the future of Germany with the Russians because they were not yet ready to discuss the problems of Germany's eastern frontiers. Nothing could be more provocative than that.

Waiting for the Strength to Blackmail?

"What was Dr. Adenauer waiting for? He had said before that he did not intend that Germany's eastern frontiers should be settled other than by peaceful negotiations. Was Dr. Adenauer waiting until west Germany's armed forces were stronger so that western Germany could take a more independent line?

"Members were being asked to face the realities of the European situation. For too long they had buried their heads in the sand. Years ago the Opposition had been saying that the re-arming of western Germany would not be a source of strength to the west but a source of alarm to Poland and eastern Germany. That was not only the Opposition's view, it was the view of a large number of Germans.

"It would be a mighty contribution to the cause of peace if there was a withdrawal of the great Powers from each other in central Europe.

Reiterating the Same Stale Formula

"Today the Foreign Secretary had reiterated the western proposal that no move could be made towards a European security system which did not first begin by a reunited Germany under free elections.

"It was unrealistic to expect the Russians to agree to a reunited and rearmed Germany joining the western alliance. This had become axiomatic. If they were to have the reunification of Germany which would assimilate the Berlin trouble, it must be assumed that a reunited Germany should not join the NATO alliance.

"Did Conservative MP's believe in their hearts that a rearmed Germany would really be a decisive contribution to the maintenance of peace? There were few members who would say 'Yes' to that privately. Having rearmed Germany we would have insoluble problems on our hands. If Germany insisted that the Oder-Neisse line should be reconsidered and Polish fears were roused, the Russians would have to decide either to let down one of their protégées and accept German blackmail, or resist German blackmail and face conflict.

"That was what the Russians meant when they said they were afraid of Germany. They feared a situation might be reached when they could be put in the dilemma of either having to lose face and dismantle and demoralize the Warsaw pact or face a resumption of hostilities. To avoid such a situation arising was the essence of diplomacy.

The Path to National Greatness

"Mr. HEALEY (Leeds, East, Lab.) The Government were much preoccupied with the pursuit of national greatness. National greatness would not be achieved by multiplying its power to destroy. It could be achieved at one stroke in breaking the present deadlock and leading humanity to peace."

—Debate on Berlin, House of Commons, Dec. 4.

"Fortunately Poland had a profound interest in preventing such a situation from developing, because it was Poland that might be carved up in an effort to prevent resumption of war. Poland was anxious that that situation should not arise.

'Polish fears put the most effective levers in British hands at the moment, but they would not be there long because the situation was getting more and more difficult.

"The Poles said, 'For Heaven's sake let the occupying Powers take their armies from central Europe.' The Poles were sufficiently statesmanlike to realize that their problem could not be solved without solving the German problem, and so they put forward this [Rapacki] plan.

"If the Germans could accept a solution of that kind, and they would accept it if it was put forward authoritatively by their allies, would our position be worsened? . . .

'The Foreign Secretary had asked the Opposition whether they considered that such an eventuality would still leave the great Power blocks in relatively the same relations of military strength. The Opposition said 'Yes.' Mr. Lloyd also asked if the Opposition thought we could afford the loss of U.S. support in Europe. The answer was 'No' as things were at present. The Opposition believed that until these various stages had been crossed it was necessary that we gave no excuse for any incidents and, therefore, the Opposition thought the American forces should still remain in Europe.

A Glimmer of Hope for Hungary

"But why should American forces have to leave Europe if there was an area of disengagement in central Europe consisting of eastern Germany, western Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Opposition would hope, Hungary? If they could have this European security system in the centre of Europe, at first Hungary might not be allowed to join or might not join, but it would be there, and would help to solve that problem too.

"He [Bevan] discussed with representative Germans last December the problem of recognizing the east German government. In the early stages that would not be necessary. All that would be needed in the early stages would be for the four Powers to decide the framework and basic principles for the future of Germany. After they were decided there would have to be representatives from eastern Germany because all kinds of problems would have to be solved. They could then be discussed without loss of face to either side.

"The representative Germans he spoke to saw nothing wrong in that. We had tied ourselves to a credo about Germany which had become more and more unrealistic and dangerous.

'The House was discussing more than the future of Germany; rather the future of the human race. The immediate problem of the recasting of European frontiers and the future of Germany was seen against a background which was increasingly alarming every thoughtful person in the world.

"Was it not time we got off the escalator and started to walk? The escalator was carrying us inevitably to destruction. Every one was beginning to develop a kind of air of inevitability. The time had come, and long past, when Great Britain should rise to its feet and give the world the lead that the world was now asking for. (Opposition cheers)."

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Mr. Dulles Finds Reasons for Non-Recognition Straight Out of Confucius

On the Alarming Decline of Ancestor Worship in the New China

Working up toward the climax of his speech in San Francisco on why we ought never—yes, never—to recognize Communist China, Mr. Dulles touched on the danger it represented to traditional Chinese culture. "The venerated graves of ancestors," said the Secretary of State, with an almost Confucian indignation, "are everywhere being desecrated." We are sorry he did not continue in this vein. It is not only ancestor worship which is declining. Marriages are being contracted in China without casting the horoscopes of bride and groom, and houses are being built without testing the site for malevolent spirits. Such defiance of Heaven must sooner or later bring the regime's downfall.

Mr. Dulles spoke of the horrors being visited on the Chinese. "Individuality and personality are brutally suppressed," Mr. Dulles said. In the good old days, the poorest coolie or rickshaw boy, after his day's work in Shanghai, could shop around according to individual taste (as his counterparts still do in Cairo and Calcutta) before deciding which doorway or gutter he would sleep in that night. Personality flowered. "Children," Mr. Dulles went on with his description of the new commune system, "are placed in wholesale nurseries, so that the women can also be part of the slave labor." In the good old days, there were no "wholesale"—or even private, retail—nurseries; children were not separated from their mothers; both worked.

Where the Good Old Days Still Exist

The good old days still exist in Hong Kong. A few days after Mr. Dulles spoke, Peggy Durdin provided a description in the *New York Times Magazine* (Dec. 7) of conditions in that city. "In some families," Miss Durdin wrote of the more fortunate, "the father has a permanent job, perhaps at piecework ten hours a day seven days a week in a Chinese factory; his wife embroiders at home while looking after three undernourished children."

Even into this paradise, the serpent of social reform has been creeping. Miss Durdin wrote of a new regulation to limit the hours of working women and children—but not men—to ten hours a day and six days a week. She quoted a leading Hong Kong paper, the *South China Morning Post*, as warning that the city must "make gradual, not revolutionary progress in this type of social reform." A few more years of godless propaganda and the male workers of Hong Kong will be demanding Sunday off, too.

This change in hours for women and children is due to foreign influence. John G. Norris in the *Washington Post* (Nov. 5) reported from Hong Kong that the regulation against work for women and children more than 6 days a week and 10 hours a day was imposed by the British colonial authorities because the home government complained of competition in cheap textiles. (Here we see how the proletariat benefits from colonialism.) The blow was softened for the Hong Kong capitalist, according to Mr. Norris, by attaching to the new regulation "no guarantee that overall wages would not be reduced." Thus the pious millowner will still be able to maintain the graves of his ancestors in the style to which they have become accustomed.

Separate But Equal Voting?

One way to compromise the voting issue might be to promise that if the South allowed Negroes to vote, Congress in return would legalize segregated ballot boxes.

Troubles Nice People Don't Talk About

"Few Hong Kong residents," Miss Durdin wrote, "face the ugly possibility that hundreds of thousands of people, without the elementary right to work, in daily view of luxury and plenty, repress resentments that might one day tragically explode into violence." When it comes we may expect Mr. Dulles to attribute the outbreak to indirect aggression, subversive propaganda and the lack of sound religious training. In Hong Kong's better circles, Miss Durdin wrote, "it is just not chic" to talk of the surrounding misery. This, too, is reminescent of the good old days everywhere in Asia.

Hong Kong teems, of course, with refugees from the Communist mainland and their flight—like that of others coming across Soviet borders—testifies to much that is wrong with the new regimes. But we had better not lean back with smug satisfaction. The misery of the China mainland is the misery of a people struggling hard with bare hands to make a leap forward out of poverty; it holds a promise for the future not to be found in the slums of Hong Kong, i.e. in the good old days. We are being blinded by hateful propaganda to the immense strides forward of the new China.

No. 3 in Steel Production

We pass on one item out of many. The *Baltimore Sun* (Dec. 9) carried a dispatch from its London bureau citing a British trade letter. It reported that this current "year of the great leap" (as the Chinese Communists call it) may enable China in 1959 to surpass Britain, West Germany and France and to become the world's third largest producer of iron and steel after the USA and the USSR. The British Council for the Promotion of International Trade says this marks "a scale of growth for which no previous parallel exists in any country" and that the Peking planners have repeatedly underestimated the rise in steel output.

A giant is awakening, dragging itself up by its bootstraps out of poverty. It is not wise to shut our eyes to this progress. It is not charitable for a people as rich and well-favored as our own to survey the scene with the self-righteous distortions of Mr. Dulles. The day may come when the new China, too, will have ample means to look after the tombs of its ancestors.

Edgar Snow on Chiang Kai-shek: "A Scavenger Among the Relics of the Past"

"Under Chiang Kai-shek's government some attempt was made to establish rule by constitution and law, some roads were built, modern banks were established, some flood control work progressed, scientific study was somewhat encouraged, educational facilities improved, and women began to claim legal equality with men. Modernization along such lines was certainly more rapid than under previous regimes; had there been no Japanese invasion Chiang might have succeeded in unifying the country under right-wing dictatorship. But the whole pace of change was too slow to cope with the deep crisis inside Chinese society. Increasingly Chiang resorted to despotism to hold back the tidal demand for revolutionary measures.

"It was, however, unfair to call Chiang a despot and let it go at that. . . . He was not a great tyrant, only a petty one . . . he never understood that his worst enemies were in his own camp. Chiang was not resolute, only obstinate; not wise, only obsolete; not original, only a scavenger among the relics of the past; and not ruthless, merely vain—as none knew better than the greedy parasites who surrounded and finally consumed him."

—Edgar Snow's new book: Journey to the Beginning.

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The Key European Issue Is Still the Nuclear Rearmament of Germany

(*Continued from Page One*)

bondholder party" (as in the Press Club speech) considered good enough for the ignorant rabble, while its betters in private decide the issues of war and peace?

It is time to look back over the events of the least two decades and see how many historic decisions have been taken without public consultation and debate, though these may foreclose our fate. The first two may be excused on the ground that they were taken in war-time; these were the decision to develop the atom bomb and the decision to drop it on Hiroshima. But the others were made in peace time. There was the decision to go ahead and try to make the H-bomb without an effort to negotiate a stopping point with the Russians; this decision, which Oppenheimer opposed with tragic consequences for himself, might never have been known at the time if former Senator Johnson of Colorado had not blurted out news of the H-bomb in a radio interview. Then came the decision to make nuclear arms "conventional," i.e. to make any future war nuclear, and now we are getting ready to make Germany a nuclear power, again without debate.

Humphrey Plays It Safe

So powerful is the hold of decisions made by a small inner group that even Senator Humphrey at his press conference on his return from Moscow said German policy was not something for any "ordinary Senator" to discuss! He defended the nuclear rearmament of Germany by saying that we were keeping custody of the nuclear arms to be sent the Reich and that the German army was *merely* being trained in their use.* The Senator, with his eye on the Presidency, is obviously intent on keeping in with the inner circle, showing himself loyal to its cliches and dependably devoted to its stereotypes, a "safe man," despite the fact that liberals and Mrs. Roosevelt like him.

Everywhere else in the world there is debate on Germany, including the Reich itself. Our papers, ballyhooing the West Berlin elections of last Sunday as an overwhelming defeat for the Communists, slid over the more important fact that they showed a larger majority than last time for the Social Democrats, who want to negotiate a neutralized Germany, over Adenauer's Christian Democrats, who find even Mr. Dulles too flexible for their taste. In Britain (see page two) the opposition has a clear alternative policy; in Canada, Lester Pearson advocates disengagement. Only here there is no alternative offered by the opposition and even Humphrey comes back from Moscow with a stultifying formula: we need do nothing but stand firm on Berlin.

Far More Dangerous Than Korea

Berlin, Humphrey says, is only a "probing" operation. But the "probe" tests our brains as well as our resolution. Berlin is only the most dramatic of a number of exposed Western salients that give Moscow and Peking the initiative; they can turn it on or shut it off as they please because our position is so exposed. Berlin can only be saved from submersion by solving the problem of German reunification; in the long run the position of West Berlin is otherwise untenable. But the East will no more agree to a reunified rearmed Germany in NATO than we would to a reunified rearmed Germany in the Warsaw pact. Yet so long as Germany is split, it is a more dangerous European Korea, more dangerous because of the exposed and encircled position of West Berlin. A majority of the city's voters are against the Free City proposal; they don't trust the East to honor that status and we don't blame them. But a majority of the city's voters are also for trying to negotiate a way out of the impasse by negotiating a neutral Germany. Our press applauds them for the first and ignores them on the second. Where do the Democrats stand on this? Why should they and Humphrey be allowed to duck the question?

Drift is not statesmanship. West Berlin will not be saved by rigidity. We suggest that the real question which ought to be thrown open to debate is this: Irrespective of what the Russians think (why must we always react to them, instead of thinking on our own?), is it to America's advantage, will it make Western Europe more secure, if we proceed to make West Germany a nuclear military power? On the basis of bitter experience, twice repeated in our lifetime, is it safe to trust them with such weapons? Can we be sure that they will not use them to blackmail a new partition of Poland and make a new deal with Moscow? Wouldn't a neutral Germany without arms be a safer bet for both sides?

* The Senator deplored the interpretation given his news conference in Geneva Nov. 22, which implied that the path to a settlement with Moscow lay in abandoning nuclear rearmament for West Germany; he claimed he was misunderstood.

VACATION NOTICE

The Weekly is published 48 times a year. Ordinarily it does not go to press the last two Thursdays in August or December. (Actually this year 49 issues were published. Because of what seemed to be an imminent summit meeting, we took no vacation during August and this issue is Vol. VI, No. 49.) The Weekly will not appear the next two weeks. Our next issue, Vol. VII, No. 1, will go to press Dec. 31, and be dated Jan. 5. We wish our readers a festive holiday and a happy New Year.

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